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TRUTH-IN-LENDING LITIGATION: WHEN THE
BORROWER GOES BANKRUPT
The primary enforcement mechanism of the Truth in Lending 4ct is the damage
remedy available to consumer borrowers. Specialproblems arise when a violation of
the Act's disclosure pro visions does not surface until an overextended borrower re-
sorts to bankruptcy court. The author argues that the rationale used by courts to
justfy a desirable result-passage to the trustee in bankruptcy of the bankrupt's right
to seek statutory damagesfrom a violating creditor--is inconsistent with thepurposes
of the Truth in Lending Act and couldfrustrate Its enforcement in the bankruptcy
context. He offers an alternative rationale-based on an analogy between Truth-in-
Lending actions and usury actions--that should effectuate more fully the objectives
of the Act.
INTRODUCTION
A READING of the newspaper advertisements for legal services
might lead a person to assume that a personal bankruptcy ad-
judication is as nonlitigious a legal event as a simple business
incorporation or an uncontested divorce proceeding.' From the
bankrupt's perspective, the matter might appear to be relatively
uncomplicated. First, a petition is filed with the bankruptcy
court.' A court-appointed trustee then marshals the bankrupt's
assets, liquidates them, and distributes dividends to claiming
creditors If the bankrupt has been honest,4 he will be left
with his exemptions,' freed from debt, and ready for a "fresh
1. See, e.g., The Plain Dealer (Cleveland), Aug. 30, 1978, at 10, col. 1 (advertising
"bankruptcy (individual)" at the same fee as "incorporation" and "uncontested divorce").
2. R. BANKR. PROC. 101. Filing the petition operates as an automatic stay of suits by
and against bankrupts, Bankruptcy Act § 1la, 11 U.S.C. § 29(a) (1976) (original version at
ch. 541, § 1la, 30 Stat. 544 (1898)). The stay precludes actions on unsecured debts, R.
BAl4IKt. PROC. 401(a), and enjoins the enforcement of liens on property in the bankrupt's
possession. R. BANKR. PROC. 601(a). The bankrupt thus receives immediate relief from
harassment by creditors.
3. 11 U.S.C. § 75(a)(1), (11) (1976); R. BANKR. PROC. 308, 605(a). The Bankruptcy
Act grants the trustee wide-ranging powers to enable him to gather assets for the estate.
This Note deals with the powers of the trustee under § 70a of the Bankruptcy Act, 11
U.S.C. § 110(a) (1976), as successor to a bankrupt's Truth-in-Lending action.
4. Liability for credit which was extended in reliance upon a false statement by the
debtor with respect to his financial condition and for debts created by "fraud, embezzle-
ment, misappropriation, or defalcation while acting as an officer or in any fiduciary capac-
ity" is not dischargeable. 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(2), (4) (1976).
5. At present, most bankruptcy exemptions are determined with reference to state
law. 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1976). The breadth of the states' exemptions varies considerably, they
typically include household furniture, wearing apparel, tools of the trade, a homestead
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start."6 In many cases, little complex legal maneuvering is neces-
sary and litigation seldom develops.
With increasing frequency, however, personal bankruptcy pro-
ceedings involve the assertion of a Truth-in-Lending action 7
against one of the claiming creditors. The action may be initiated
by the trustee in bankruptcy-either as a counterclaim to the
lender-creditor's claim against the bankrupt's estate,8 or as a sepa-
rate action outside the bankruptcy court.9 If the trustee declines to
sue the lender, the former debtor may pursue the matter person-
ally after he is adjudged bankrupt.10 The Truth in Lending Act
authorizes suit in any court of "competent jurisdiction";" l the
bankruptcy court itself often has jurisdiction over a bankrupt's
Truth-in-Lending action brought by the trustee. 12
allowance, and insurance policies. See J. MACLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
BANKRUPTCY 155-56 (1956).
6. See Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18, 20 (1970); Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S.
243, 245 (1933).
7. Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, tit. I, 82 Stat. 146, as amended by Fair
Credit Billing Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, tit. III, 88 Stat. 1511; by Act of Feb. 27, 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-222, § 3, 90 Stat. 197; and by Consumer Leasing Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-240, 90 Stat. 257 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1976)). In order to achieve
"meaningful disclosure of credit terms" and to enable consumers to "compare more readily
the various credit terms available... and avoid the uninformed use of credit," the Act
provides consumers a civil damage action. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1640 (1976). Lenders who
fail to make the required disclosures are liable to borrowers for actual and statutory dam-
ages; in some cases rescission is available. Id. §§ 1635, 1640(a).
8. See, ag, Liberty Loan Corp. v. Boyajian (In re Dunne), 407 F. Supp. 308 (D.R.I.
1976). Rule 13 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (counterclaim and cross-claim)
applies generally to proceedings in bankruptcy court. R. BANKR. PROC. 713.
9. See, ag., Murphy v. Household Fin. Corp., 560 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1977); Porter v.
Household Fin. Corp., 385 F. Supp. 336 (S.D. Ohio 1974).
10. See, ag., Newton v. Beneficial Fin. Corp., 558 F.2d 731 (5th Cir. 1977).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1976).
12. Bankruptcy courts currently have jurisdiction over trustees' Truth-in-Lending
claims in any of the three following circumstances:
(1) When the lender-defendant files with the bankruptcy court a proof of its claim against
the bankrupt estate. See Meehan v. Nelsonville (In re Warren), 387 F. Supp. 1395 (S.D.
Ohio 1975). As creditor, it must file a proof of claim with the court if it wishes to partici-
pate in any distributions from the estate. I1 U.S.C. § 93(a) (1976); R. BANKR. PROC.
302(a).
(2) When the secured lender-defendant files a petition to reclaim its security. See General
Fin. Corp. v. Ganer (In re Garner), 556 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1977) (bankruptcy court has
jurisdiction over counterclaim alleging Truth-in-Lending violation filed by debtor pursu-
ant to creditor's reclamation petition in chapter XIII extension proceeding). The bank-
rupt's original petition for discharge operates as an automatic stay against enforcement of
any liens on property in his possession. R. BANR. PROC. 601(a). Secured creditors wish-
ing to reclaim their collateral must petition the bankruptcy court for relief before they may
repossess the property. R. BANK. PIoc. 601(c).
(3) When the lender-defendant fails to object to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court
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An underlying premise of this Note is that a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding is an opportune time for uncovering violations of the
Truth in Lending Act's disclosure requirements and for enforcing
the Act. 3 The Bankruptcy Act requires thorough inquiry by the
trustee in bankruptcy and by the court itself into the bankrupt's
financial affairs-particularly into the causes of the bankruptcy. 4
In addition, the trustee has the responsibility generally to locate
and liquidate as much wealth as possible for the benefit of all the
creditors. 5 Consequently, a bankruptcy proceeding can prompt
an investigation into whether the bankrupt overextended himself
due to a particular lender's failure to disclose information con-
cerning credit terms and whether damages may be recovered from
that lender for the estate and, ultimately, for distribution to the
properly disclosing creditors.' 6
The achievement of effective and fair enforcement of the
Truth in Lending Act in the bankruptcy context requires the reso-
over the trustee's Truth-in-Lending claim. 11 U.S.C. § ll(a)(7) (1976); R. BANKR. PROC.
915(a); see Liberty Loan Corp. v. Boyajian (In re Dunne), 407 F. Supp. 308, 310 (D.R.I.
1976). If none of these three circumstances are present, the trustee must file a separate civil
action in federal district court or state court. I 1 U.S.C. §§ 29(e), 46 (1976).
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 389 BANKR. L.
REP. (CCH) pt. 2, will establish new bankruptcy courts with expanded jurisdiction. These
new courts will have the powers of "court[s] of equity, law, and admiralty. ... Id. §
241(a) (to be codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1481). Their jurisdiction will extend over "all civil
proceedings. . . related to cases under [the Bankruptcy Act]." Id. § 241(a) (to be codified
in 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b)). After April 1, 1984, when the jurisdictional provisions of the new
Act become effective, a trustee pursuing a bankrupt's Truth-in-Lending claim should never
have to resort to state courts or federal district court. Even if none of the foregoing juris-
diction-conferring circumstances are present, resolution of the Truth-in-Lending matter
could proceed directly in bankruptcy court. Of course, opportunities to pursue Truth-in-
Lending claims are likely to continue to devolve upon trustees under the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act. See notes 34 & 83 infra.
13. See Boyajian, The Trustee in Bankruptcy and the Federal Truth in Lending Act, 51
AM. BANKR. L.J. 63 (1977); Dilenschneider, Regulation, Another Role for the Trustee, 48
AM. BANKR. L.J. 209 (1974).
14. The statutory language provides: "The bankrupt shall... submit to an examina-
tion concerning.. . the cause of his bankruptcy [and) his dealings with his creditors .. "
11 U.S.C. § 25(a)(10) (1976). Disclosure violations may also be discovered when the bank-
rupt's attorney inspects the loan documents while preparing the petition for bankruptcy
adjudication. The official bankruptcy forms require the listing of any claims that the bank-
rupt may have as assets of the estate. See Official Forms in Bankruptcy, form 6, schedule
B-2, item q (Collier pamph. ed. 1975).
15. See II U.S.C. § 75(a)(1) (1976).
16. The trustee has an additional incentive to augment the estate through the prosecu-
tion of causes of action on behalf of the estate since his fee is determined as a percentage of
the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 76(c) (1976). When the trustee acts as his own attorney, the possi-
bility of a liberal award of attorney's fees further enhances the incentive for him to pursue
a bankrupt's Truth-in-Lending action. See note 68 infra.
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lution of two thorny issues. First, a court must determine that the
right to pursue the Truth-in-Lending action passes to the trustee
along with the bankrupt's other nonexempt property rights.
Otherwise, the bankrupt retains the right to sue the lender after he
is declared to be bankrupt and receives his discharge from indebt-
edness. If he wins the postbankruptcy suit, he may retain the pro-
ceeds free of all creditors' claims, leaving him with an
unjustifiable windfall. 7 Second, the violating creditor should not
be permitted to set off the amount of its Truth-in-Lending liability
against the amount of its claim to the bankrupt's estate. Although
set-off is allowed by the Bankruptcy Act,' 8 the deterrent force of
the Truth in Lending Act would be vitiated when a borrower who
had received inadequate information concerning credit terms be-
comes bankrupt. 19
Paradoxically, the reasoning used by courts to prevent lenders
from setting off their Truth-in-Lending liability conflicts directly
with the rationale advanced to allow the Truth-in-Lending claim
to pass to the trustee.2 0 This Note proposes an alternative ration-
ale based on an analogy between Truth-in-Lending actions and
usury actions. The proposed rationale would permit Truth-in-
Lending claims to pass to trustees in bankruptcy without jeopard-
izing through set-off the deterrent objectives of the Truth in Lend-
ing Act.
I. PASSAGE OF THE RIGHT TO PURSUE A BANKRUPT'S TRUTH-
IN-LENDING ACTION TO THE TRUSTEE IN
BANKRUPTCY
When a person petitions a bankruptcy court for discharge
from indebtedness, title to all his nonexempt transferable prop-
erty, as well as the right to pursue certain of his causes of action,
vests in the trustee in bankruptcy. Neither the Bankruptcy Act
17. See Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. DeWitt, 237 U.S. 447 (1915); Newton v. Bene-
ficial Fin. Corp., 558 F.2d 731 (5th Cir. 1977).
18. 11 U.S.C. § 108 (1976). See General Fin. Corp. v. Garner (In re Garner), 556
F.2d 772, 780 (5th Cir. 1977).
19. See text accompanying notes 77-83 infra.
20. Confusion has resulted because judicial decisions on both issues have turned on
an elusive determination of whether the cause of action created by the Truth in Lending
Act is penal or remedial. Compare Murphy v. Household Fin. Corp., 560 F.2d 206 (6th
Cir. 1977) (Truth-in-Lending action passes to trustee because it is not penal) with Newton
v. Beneficial Fin. Corp., 558 F.2d 731 (5th Cir. 1977) (Truth-in-Lending liability not set off
against debt discharged in bankruptcy because Truth in Lending Act creates a penal cause
of action). See text accompanying notes 56-74 infra.
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nor the Truth in Lending Act speak directly to the issue of
whether the bankrupt's Truth-in-Lending action passes to his le-
gal representative. Therefore, the language and judicial interpre-
tations of the Bankruptcy Act that define the trustee's rights must
be analyzed closely.
Section 70a of the present Bankruptcy Act"' provides:
The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt . . . shall . . . be
vested by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt as of
the date of the filing of the petition initiating a proceeding
under this Act, except insofar as it is to property which is held
to be exempt, to all of the following kinds of property wherever
located: . . . (5) property, including rights of action, which
prior to the filing of the petition he could by any means have
transferred or which might have been levied upon and sold
under judicial process against him, or otherwise seized, im-
pounded, or sequestered. . ; (6) rights of action arising upon
contracts, or usury ....
The language is sweeping,22 but two general exceptions have
been created. First, bankrupts have convinced the courts that
deprivation of some items, such as vacation pay and the right to
future wages, would unfairly impede the bankrupt's "fresh start"
after bankruptcy.23 Accordingly, these items have emerged as
limitations on the meaning of "property" which vests in the
trustee pursuant to section 70a(5). The other exception centers on
the language in section 70a(5) relating to the transfer of rights of
action to the trustee. The trustee is likely to pursue any promising
rights of action for the benefit of the estate and, ultimately, for
distribution of the proceeds to creditors. Yet under section 70a(5),
only the bankrupt's transferable rights of action pass to the
trustee. Consequently, parties sued by the trustee may assert that
the right of action involved is not transferable, that it remains with
the bankrupt, and that the trustee therefore has no standing to
bring the suit.24
21. 11 U.S.C. § I 10(a)(5)-(6) (1976).
22. The Supreme Court stated in Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379 (1966):
"The main thrust of § 70a(5) is to secure for creditors everything of value the
bankrupt may possess in alienable or leviable form when he files his petition. To
this end the term 'property' has been construed most generously and an interest is
not outside its reach because it is novel or contingent or because enjoyment must
be -postponed."
23. See Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18 (1970); Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234
(1934).




A. The Fresh Start Policy. No Impediment to Truth-in-Lending
Enforcement in Bankruptcy Cases
At one time the fresh start policy, with its restrictive interpreta-
tion of what "property" passes to the trustee pursuant to section
70a of the Bankruptcy Act, was interpreted as a possible hin-
drance to the passage of a bankrupt's Truth-in-Lending claim to
the trustee.2 5 The United States Supreme Court's recent discus-
sions of the fresh start policy suggest, however, that the bankrupt
should not retain the right to sue to the exclusion of the trustee.
The judicially-created fresh start policy enables a bankrupt to
retain certain property and rights which otherwise would pass to
the trustee under a literal reading of the bankruptcy statute.26 In
order to give the bankrupt a "new opportunity in life and [a] clear
field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discour-
agement of preexisting debt,"2 7 the Supreme Court has carved a
narrow class of exceptions into section 70a. Thus, accrued but un-
paid vacation pay does not pass to the trustee, since depriving the
bankrupt of such a benefit would hinder his ability to achieve an
"unencumbered fresh start."28 For similar reasons, an assignment
of wages does not pass to the trustee.2 9 Bankruptcy relief would
have little meaning if the bankrupt were required perpetually to
hand over his wages to his creditors.
Recently, however, the Supreme Court has taken a narrower
view of bankrupts' fresh start requisites and a broader view of
trustees' rights. In Kokoszka v. Be/ford,3° the Court unanimously
decided that the right to receive an income tax refund passes to
the trustee for distribution to creditors. As the Court explained,
an income tax refund differs from accrued but unpaid vacation
pay since a tax refund is not "designed to function as a wage sub-
stitute at some future period . . . to 'support the basic require-
ments of life for [the debtors] and their families .. .'31 Thus,
even though it is derived directly from wages, the income tax re-
fund passes to the trustee as "property" under section 70a because
it is so "rooted in the prebankruptcy past" that depriving the
25. Dilenschneider, supra note 13, at 216 n.25.
26. See J. MACLACHLAN, supra note 5, at 88.
27. Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18, 20 (1970) (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292
U.S. 234, 245 (1934)).
28. 400 U.S. at 20.
29. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
30. 417 U.S. 642 (1974).
31. Id. at 648 (quoting in part Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. at 20).
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bankrupt of it would not hinder his "fresh start." 3 2
After Kokoszka it is unrealistic to suggest that the fresh start
policy affords the bankrupt an argument that he should retain the
exclusive right to pursue his Truth-in-Lending claim in a post-
bankruptcy suit.33  That right is not even remotely related to
wages; the transaction upon which it is based-namely, borrowing
money from a commercial lender-is clearly "rooted in the
prebankruptcy past." In sum, the fresh start policy should present
no obstacle to enforcement of the Truth in Lending Act by trust-
ees in bankruptcy. The present Bankruptcy Act's other restriction
on the trustee's rights to a bankrupt's causes of action-the re-
quirement of transferability-presents more substantial difficul-
ties. 34
B. Transferabili&y of the Cause of Action: The Survival-of-
Actions Rationale
Under sections 70a(5) and 70a(6) of the current Bankruptcy
Act, only those rights of action which (1) the bankrupt "could by
any means have transferred; '35 (2) "might have been levied upon
and sold under judicial process against him, or otherwise seized,
32. Id. Cynical observers point out that a tax refund check payable to the bankrupt
for $150 is just enough to cover the trustee's discretionary fee, see 11 U.S.C. § 76(c)(1)
(1976), which, under the Bankruptcy Act's priority scheme, 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(1) (1976), is
deducted from the estate before distributions, if any, are made to creditors. HousE COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, BANKRUPTCY LAW REVISION, H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., Ist
Sess. 94 (1977).
33. With the approval of the court, however, the trustee may abandon the Truth-in-
Lending claim, allowing it to revert to the bankrupt. R. BANKR. PROC. 608. If the claim
has not been adjudicated when the estate is closed, it is deemed to have been abandoned
with the court's approval. Id. Under these circumstances, the discharged debtor is free to
pursue the claim in a postbankruptcy suit. See Newton v. Beneficial Fin. Corp., 558 F.2d
731 (5th Cir. 1977); Note, Abandonment ofAssets by a Trustee in Bankruptcy, 53 COLUM. L.
REv. 415 (1953).
34. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, effective October 1, 1979, eliminates the
provision of the current Bankruptcy Act that only "transferable" property rights of the
bankrupt may pass to the trustee. See I1 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1976). The new Act considera-
bly streamlines the language defining the trustees' title; the estate is comprised generally of
"all legal or equitable rights of the debtor in property .. " Bankruptcy Reform Act,
supra note 12, § 101 (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)). No express reference to the
passage of causes of action appears in the new Act. It seems clear, however, that the right
to bring a Truth-in-Lending action for statutory damages constitutes a "legal or equitable
interest. . . in property" and therefore would pass to the trustee. The demise of the trans-
ferability requirement leaves little margin for arguing that any right of action of a bankrupt
is beyond the trustee's grasp, regardless of the personal or punitive characteristics of the
right. See text accompanying notes 54-56 infra.
35. 11 U.S.C. § l10(a)(5) (1976).
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impounded, or sequestered;"36 (3) arise upon contracts; 37 or (4)
arise upon usury38 pass to the trustee. The cause of action author-
ized by the Truth in Lending Act presents special problems be-
cause it does not fall squarely into any of these four categories.
Courts confronted with the issue of passage of a Truth-in-Lending
claim to the trustee have focused almost exclusively on the trans-
ferability of the claim rather than considering the other three pos-
sible grounds for passage to the trustee.39 Murphy v. Household
Finance Corp.,'4 the first United States court of appeals decision
to hold that a Truth-in-Lending action passes to a trustee in bank-
ruptcy, is typical of this line of analysis.
In Murphy, Randy and Carol Westbrook had obtained a con-
sumer loan in the amount of $894.91 from Household Finance
Corporation.4 Ten months after receiving the loan the West-
brooks filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy. When the trustee
appointed for the Westbrooks examined their financial records, he
discovered that Household Finance had provided them with illeg-
ible credit disclosure statements. The trustee filed suit in district
court alleging violations of the Truth in Lending Act and regula-
tion Z42 and seeking statutory damages under section 130(a) of the
Act.43 Household Finance stipulated that the illegible forms did
36. Id.
37. Id. § l10(a)(6).
38. Id.
39. See Murphy v. Household Fin. Corp., 560 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1977); Porter v.
Household Fin. Corp., 385 F. Supp. 336 (S.D. Ohio 1974). But see Liberty Loan Corp. v.
Boyajian (In re Dunne), 407 F. Supp. 308 (D.R.I. 1976).
40. 560 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1977), noted in Dilenschneider, Truth in Lending Actions
Pass to Trustee in Bankruptcy, 51 AM. BANKR. L.J. 371 (1977).
41. 560 F.2d at 207.
42. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.1002 (1977). The illegible documents constituted a violation
of § 226.6(a) (general disclosure requirements).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1976). This section provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, any creditor who fails to comply
with any requirement imposed under this part of part D or E of this subchapter
with respect to any person is liable to such person in an amount equal to the sum
of-
(1) any actual damage sustained by such person as a result of the failure;
(2) (A)(i) in the case of an individual action twice the amount of any finance
charge in connection with the transaction, or (ii) in the case of an individual ac-
tion relating to a consumer lease under part E of this subchapter, 25 per centum
of the total amount of monthly payments under the lease, except that the liability
under this subparagraph shall not be less than $100 nor greater than $1,000; or
(B) in the case of a class action, such amount as the court may allow,
except that as to each member of the class no minimum recovery shall be applica-
ble, and the total recovery in such action shall not be more than the lesser of
$500,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth of the creditor, and
(3) in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing liability the
19781
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not comply with the Act's disclosure requirements but challenged
the standing of the trustee to sue.44
The sole issue, as the district court viewed the case, was
whether the Westbrooks' cause of action passed to the trustee as
part of the estate.45  Following Porter v. Household Finance
Corp. ,46 the district court held that the Westbrooks' Truth-in-
Lending action did pass to the trustee.4 7 The Sixth Circuit af-
firmed.48
Putting aside momentarily the court of appeals' mode of anal-
ysis, one can see that its conclusion is a desirable one. If the cause
of action cannot pass to the trustee, the bankrupt simply would
retain it.49  After receiving his discharge from indebtedness, he
then could sue the Truth-in-Lending violator in his own right.
Any recovery he obtained in the postbankruptcy suit would es-
cape distribution to creditors.5 It would be difficult to justify
such a windfall to the bankrupt who, once in bankruptcy court,
discovers he was fortunate enough to have been the victim of im-
proper credit disclosure. Moreover, the debtor's assumption of li-
abilities beyond his means and his consequent bankruptcy may
indeed be attributable to his lack of information concerning credit
terms.5' It is thus appropriate that any recovery resulting from
improper disclosure practices be distributed among those scrupu-
costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the
court.
44. 424 F. Supp. 176, 177 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
45. Id.
46. 385 F. Supp. 336 (S.D. Ohio 1974). In Porter, the court held that the right to
pursue a bankrupt's Truth-in-Lending action does pass to the trustee; it found, however,
that no violation of the Act's disclosure requirements had occurred. Having prevailed on
the merits, the lender was precluded from appeal, and the Porter case stood as an impor-
tant precedent for trustees wishing to pursue bankrupts' Truth-in-Lending claims.
47. 424 F. Supp. at 179.
48. Murphy v. Household Fin. Corp., 560 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1977).
49. See Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. DeWitt, 237 U.S. 447 (1915) (effect of a confir-
mation in a composition proceeding is to reinvest the bankrupt with all his property, in-
cluding rights of action, free from creditors' claims).
50. Newton v. Beneficial Fin. Corp., 558 F.2d 731 (5th Cir. 1977). A discussion of the
problems associated with the retention of causes of action by bankrupts appears in King,
Post-Bankruptcy Suits Against Proving Creditors on Claims Abandoned by the Trustee in
Bankruptcy, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 250 (1962).
5I. Reviewing the congressional hearings and studies which preceded enactment of
the Truth in Lending Act, the Supreme Court has noted the connection between improper
disclosure practices and the inability to meet financial obligations: "Because of the diver-
gent, and at times fraudulent, practices by which consumers were informed of the terms of
the credit extended to them, many consumers were prevented from shopping for the best
terms available and, at times, were prompted to assume liabilities they could not meet."
Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 363 (1973) (footnote omitted).
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lous creditors who bear the loss when bankruptcy eventuates.
That allocation is possible only if the trustee acquires the right to
sue on behalf of the estate. Thus, the result in Murphy seems fair.
The way in which the court reached that result, however, presents
difficulties.
The district court held that the Westbrooks' Truth-in-Lending
action fell within each of the four forms of property which pass to
the trustee pursuant to sections 70a(5) and 70a(6) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act.5 2 Rather than exploring all four alternative grounds
presented by the district court, however, the court of appeals
based its decision solely on its finding that a Truth-in-Lending
claim "is a right of action which the bankrupt 'could. . .have
transferred' prior to bankruptcy within the meaning of § 70a(5)
",53
The appellate court accepted the parties' stipulation that "a
cause of action is transferrable [sic] for Bankruptcy Act purposes
if the action would 'survive' the death of the holder, but that ac-
tions for penalties. . . do not survive and thus are not transfer-
rable [sic]."54 The court thus adopted a mode of analysis entirely
dependent upon common law rules concerning the survival of ac-
tions. The court considered a Truth-in-Lending action to be one
for "tortious interference with property," an action that would
survive at common law.5 Yet the court's inquiry did not end
here; in addition, the action had to be construed as remedial
52. 424 F. Supp. at 179. In particular, the district court viewed the Truth-in-Lending
action as a right of action which (1) the bankrupt "could by any means have transferred,"
11 U.S.C. § 110 (a)(5) (1976); (2) "might have been levied upon and sold under judicial
process against him, or otherwise seized, impounded, or sequestered," id.; (3) arose upon
contract, id. § 1 10(a)(6); and (4) arose upon usury, id See text accompanying notes 35-38
supra.
The characterization of a Truth-in-Lending claim in the alternative as an action which
might have been levied upon and sold under judicial process against the bankrupt under
§ 70a(5) does not resolve the passage question, but merely repeats it, since only transferable
causes of action are subject to judicial process. SeeInre Schmelzer, 350 F. Supp. 429 (S.D.
Ohio 1972), afd sub nom. Schmeizer v. Cesner, 480 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir. 1973).
53. 560 F.2d at 208.
54. Id.
55. Id. The court of appeals thereby affirmed the district court's reliance on the
Porter court's similar conclusion. 385 F. Supp. at 344. The Porter court stated that
"[w]hen a federal statute is silent about survivability, it survives or not according to the
principles of the common law." Id. at 343. That court thus adopted the common law rule
of survivability that "tort actions for personal wrongs (e.g., slander, libel and malicious
prosecution) do not survive, while actions affecting property rights or monetary interests do
survive." Id. at 344. Porter maintained that a Truth-in-Lending action was for a "tortious
interference with property rights or monetary interests," and therefore, that it survived and
was assignable at common law. Id.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
rather than penal since under the common law penal actions do
not survive.5 6 This analysis poses problems because a Truth-in-
Lending action has both remedial and penal aspects.
In drawing the necessary distinction between penal and reme-
dial statutory schemes, the Murphy court employed a three-
pronged test. First, the court considered "whether the purpose of
the statute [is] to redress individual wrongs" and thus remedy an
isolated, particular injury, or to rectify "more general wrongs to
the public" and thereby impose a penalty on the wrongdoer for
the benefit of the public.17 The court concluded that the wrong
addressed by the Truth in Lending Act is "primarily a wrong to
the individual" and that a Truth-in-Lending action is thus in-
tended to serve as a remedy rather than a penalty.5"
This conclusion, however, belies the factual context in which
Truth-in-Lending actions arise and overlooks the purpose of the
Act. The "wrong" frequently has wide ramifications. Institutions
which extend credit to consumers do not draft completely new
contracts for each individual loan transaction; rather, mass-
printed forms are used. 9 Copies of the same defective disclosure
statement may be given to a large number of borrowers.6" Even
when a single borrower is furnished with an illegible or incorrectly
completed disclosure statement, the misrepresentation of credit
terms may have prevented that borrower from purchasing less ex-
pensive credit from a competing lender. Enforcement of the
Truth in Lending Act induces lenders to print and complete their
forms in accordance with the disclosure requirements of the Act.
In this way, the Act benefits the public-including both borrowers
and lenders-by facilitating the selection of the most favorable
credit terms.
The language of the statute itself evinces a congressional pur-
pose to serve interests of the widest public concern. Section 1601
states:
61
The Congress finds that economic stabilization would be
56. 560 F.2d at 208, 210.
57. Id. at 209. See also Porter v. Household Fin. Corp., 385 F. Supp. 336, 341 (S.D.
Ohio 1974).
58. 560 F.2d at 210.
59. For a collection of sample loan contracts with suggested forms for disclosure state-
ments, see I R. CLONTZ, supra note 24, $ 7.03, at 7-14 to 93 (4th ed. 1976).
60. The Act recognizes the class action as an effective device for enforcement and
redress when a single violation results in numerous borrowers' receiving insufficient infor-
mation concerning credit terms. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B) (1976).
61. Id. § 1601(a).
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enhanced and the competition among the various financial in-
stitutions and other firms engaged in the extension of consumer
credit would be strengthened by the informed use of credit.
The informed use of credit results from an awareness of the
cost thereof by consumers. It is the purpose of this subchapter
to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the
consumer will be able to compare more readily the various
credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of
credit.
Congress determined that uninformed borrowing has wide im-
pact. By failing to disclose credit costs accurately, lenders hinder
comparison shopping, thus inhibiting competition and harming
the national economy. Broader legislative concerns can hardly be
imagined. In short, the line separating conduct which harms only
a few individuals from conduct which harms society as a whole is
often imprecise. Consequently, determining whether a cause of
action is remedial or penal by looking to the number of people
affected by a single wrong is inappropriate when commercial
practices and consumer-oriented legislation are involved.
The second element of the Murphy court's test of whether a
cause of action provides a remedy (and thus survives) or imposes
a penalty (and thus does not survive) is "whether recovery under
the statute runs to the harmed individual or to the public. '62 The
distinction drawn here is not especially discriminating; obviously
the recovery in any successful civil action goes to the plaintiff.
Nonetheless, in order to maintain its thesis that the Truth-in-
Lending action is not penal and for that reason passes to the
trustee, the court had to emphasize that in the instant case no
criminal fines were imposed for the benefit of the public coffers.63
Finally, the court looked to "whether the recovery authorized
by the statute is wholly disproportionate to the harm suffered." 64
The court concluded that "[tihe cause of action is not made penal
by the fact that the statute allows cumulative recoveries. .... ,65
62. 560 F.2d at 209. The question posed by this element of the test is loaded: it as-
sumes that unacceptable credit practices harm only the individual plaintiff.
63. Id. at 210.
64. Id. at 209.
65. Id. at 210. Although the Murphy court recognized that the cumulative recovery
provisions were designed to encourage private enforcement of the Act, id., both Murphy
and Porter assumed the view that Truth-in-Lending liability is primarily compensatory.
In Porter, the trustee asserted that the annual percentage rate of interest on the bankrupt's
loan was misstated, in violation of § 1605(b) of the Act, because the lender had not in-
eluded mandatory credit life insurance charges as interest when computing the annual per-
centage interest rate. 385 F. Supp. at 342. The Murphy court adopted the reasoning of
Porter:
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A review of the operation of the Act indicates, however, that the
effect of its enforcement may in fact be as punitive as it is reme-
dial or compensatory. The Act allows for recovery in excess of
any pecuniary loss of the plaintiff.66 A plaintiff may recover not
only his actual damages, but also twice the amount of his finance
charge, plus costs and attorney's fees. 67 Numerous cases have in-
volved awards of attorney's fees in excess of $10,000.68 A bor-
rower furnished with inadequate disclosure material may recover
even though no finance charge was imposed in the credit transac-
tion.69 Furthermore, an aggrieved debtor may recover even if he
suffered no actual damages as a result of the nondisclosure.70
And courts frequently have given borrowers rescission and dam-
age awards concurrently.7I Results such as these, which clearly do
more than make the borrower whole, strongly suggest a punitive
purpose whose ultimate end is deterrence: civil liability is pro-
vided to encourage private enforcement by consumers to deter un-
acceptable credit practices.72
If the allegations are true, the debtor's monetary interests were adversely affected
in that the cost of credit was greater than represented. The misrepresentation of
the cost of credit may have prevented the debtor from obtaining cheaper credit
after comparison shopping. The debtor's actual damages are difficult to ascer-
tain. Nonetheless, the creditor has injured the debtor in his monetary interests by
misrepresenting the cost of credit. And the Truth-in-Lending Act avoids the diffi-
culty in calculating damages by providing for liquidated damages of twice the
amount of the finance charge.
385 F. Supp. at 342 (footnote omitted), quoted in Murphy v. Household Fin. Corp., 560
F.2d 206, 210 (6th Cir. 1977). See also Bostwick v. Cohen, 319 F. Supp. 875 (N.D. Ohio
1970).
66. In addition to recovery for "any actual damage sustained ... as a result of [infor-
mation] failure," Truth-in-Lending plaintiffs may recover "twice the amount of any fi-
nance charge in connection with the transaction" with minimum and maximum recoveries
of $100 and $1,000. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1976).
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Baker v. Shaker Sav. Ass'n, 5 CoNs. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 98,794
(N.D. Ohio 1974) ($1000 damages, $18,537.53 attorney's fees); Welmaker v. W.T. Grant
Co., 365 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (nominal damages, $17,500 attorney's fees); Ratner
v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) ($100 damages,
$20,000 attorney's fees).
69. Mourning v. Family Publications Serv. Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973).
70. In Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1971),
the court said, "[Congress] invited people like the present plaintiff, whether they were them-
selves deceived or not, to sue in the public interest." Id. at 280 (emphasis added).
71. Sellers v. Wollman, 510 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1975); Eby v. Reb Realty, Inc., 495 F.2d
646 (9th Cir. 1974). Contra, Bostwick v. Cohen, 319 F. Supp. 875 (N.D. Ohio 1970). For
discussions of this conflict, see Note, Truth in Lending Litigation: Concurrent Recourse to
Rescission and the Civil Penalty, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 840 (1975); Comment, Private
Remedies under the Truth-in-Lending Act: The Relationship 6etween Rescission and Civil
Liability, 57 IOWA L. REv. 199 (1971).
72. See Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 280 (S.D.N.Y.
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As the foregoing suggests, pigeonholing Truth-in-Lending lia-
bility as either a penalty for a public wrong or a remedy for a
private wrong is a futile, inconclusive endeavor. If liability is im-
posed for improper lending practices, not only is the plaintiff com-
pensated by the remedy provided, but also consumers as a whole
benefit from the deterrent effect of that remedy. The Murphy
court recognized this duality: "The Truth in Lending Act ulti-
mately serves the dual purpose of providing a remedy for harm to
the monetary interests of individuals while serving to deter unde-
sirable lending practices. 73 Indeed, the court noted the broad,
societal goals of the Act to enhance "economic stabilization" and
to strengthen "competition among . . financial institutions."'74
Yet, having adopted the survival-of-actions rationale as the justifi-
cation for the clearly desirable result of allowing the trustee to
recover for the estate, the court was forced to engage in an attenu-
ated labeling process. The chameleon-like nature of the labels
makes the remedy-penalty dichotomy a precarious ground on
which to base the passage to the trustee of the right to sue. It
makes more sense to acknowledge the actual nature of the Act as
being both penal and remedial than to dichotomize its purposes as
primarily one or the other.
Evaluation of a Truth-in-Lending action in the context of
whether it "survives" the "death" of the bankrupt unnecessarily
complicates the issue of whether the cause of action passes to the
bankrupt's trustee. The policies underlying the survival-of-actions
rule were not formulated with reference to bankruptcy law and do
not conform to the debtor-creditor context." The fiction that the
1971). Only by emphasizing the penal, deterrent objectives of the Act can the instances
observed in the text bejustified. Those results would be unlikely under the Murphy view of
Truth-in-Lending liability as being primarily remedial and compensatory.
73. 560 F.2d at 211.
74. Id. at 209.
75. See J. MACLACHLAN, supra note 5, at 171. Although their precise origin is ob-
scure, the survival rules seem to have developed from the conceptual intermingling of tort
compensation with the crown's administration of criminal punishment in the early com-
mon law. See W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 898 (4th ed. 1971). If a
defendant were convicted of a crime of homicide, the crown would execute him and confis-
cate all his property. No assets remained to compensate the victim's family in a tort action.
And if the plaintiff died, he could not be made "whole" again, and his cause of action was
deemed to have died with him. Id.
The survival of personal tort actions has also been limited for fear of creating a market
in lawsuits and encouraging needless litigation. Thus the ancient sanctions against chain-
perty, maintenance, and barratry limited the transferability of such actions. See J. MAC-
LACHLAN, supra note 5, at 171. Today, in the bankruptcy situation, the passage of a
bankrupt's personal injury action is looked upon with disfavor as an encouragement of a
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bankrupt has "died" with respect to his causes of action is mis-
leading. After all, the bankrupt still breathes. If his cause of ac-
tion is deemed not to have "survived" his "death" in bankruptcy
court, the result is simply that the trustee does not acquire it as
part of the estate. After his discharge the former debtor may sue
with renewed vitality and, if successful, may retain the proceeds
free from the claims of the former creditors.76
In that light, the court of appeals' conclusion in Murphy that
the trustee has standing to pursue a bankrupt's Truth-in-Lending
action is correct. But employing the survival-of-actions rationale
to achieve this result seems an artificial mode of analysis. Once a
court determines, as did the Murphy court, that the common law
rules relating to the survival of actions provide the/only touch-
stone for passage of Truth-in-Lending actions to the trustee, the
deterrent, punitive aspects of the statutory liability must be dis-
missed in order to permit the trustee to recover for the estate. And
the real difficulty with the characterization of Truth-in-Lending
actions as "not penal" is that it seriously impedes the satisfactory
resolution of those Truth-in-Lending problems in which a recog-
nition of the Act's punitive aspects is crucial. One such problem
in the bankruptcy context is that of set-off.
II. SET-OFF IN BANKRUPTCY
In consumer bankruptcy cases, set-off takes on an unusual sig-
nificance. Special problems arise when the lender who has fur-
nished insufficient information in a credit transaction is also a
creditor with a claim against the estate. If the bankruptcy court
allows set-off, the creditor merely reduces his claim against the
bankrupt's estate by the amount of the judgment against him.
When that occurs, the creditor's liability on the Truth-in-Lending
claim is effectively vitiated by a simple exercise of arithmetic.
For example, if the bankrupt owed a creditor $2,500, and the
trustee recovered maximum damages of $1,000 from that creditor
for violations of the Truth in Lending Act, the creditor's claim
after set-off would be $1,500. Since in most personal bankruptcies
no assets remain after exemptions for distribution to general cred-
market "in the pain and suffering of unfortunate persons . I. " in re Schmelzer, 350 F.
Supp. 429, 437 (S.D. Ohio 1972), aJdsub nom. Schmelzer v. Cesner, 480 F.2d 1074 (6th
Cir. 1973). This view is inappropriate, however, when the cause of action is based on a
purely commercial transaction. Therefore, it should present no obstacle in analyzing the
passage of a Truth-in-Lending action to the trustee.
76. Newton v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 558 F.2d 731 (5th Cir. 1977).
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itors," the violating creditor would receive nothing, regardless of
whether the amount of his claim against the bankrupt estate was
$1,500 or the full $2,500. The Truth-in-Lending liability is simply
swallowed up: the bankrupt's debt absorbs it. When that debt is
discharged in bankruptcy, the Truth-in-Lending liability will dis-
appear. Because of the operation of set-off, the creditor is never
made to satisfy the Truth-in-Lending judgment.78
If, on the other hand, the court did not permit set-off, the vio-
lating creditor's net loss in the present example would be $3,500.
In addition to the discharge of the $2,500 outstanding on the loan,
the creditor would have to pay the estate $1,000 in satisfaction of
the Truth-in-Lending judgment. The other creditors would re-
ceive pro rata shares79 of this additional amount. The loss Suf-
fered by the violating creditor over and above the bad debt loss
would provide an incentive to comply with the Act.8 0
It is evident that permitting the set-off of Truth-in-Lending li-
ability against a worthless debt would frustrate the deterrent pur-
poses of the Act and render litigation of the Truth-in-Lending
claim a futile performance. However, no language in the Bank-
ruptcy Act limits the operation of set-off. Section 68 of the Act
simply provides: "In all cases of mutual debts or mutual credits
between the estate of a bankrupt and a creditor the account shall
be stated and one debt shall be set off against the other, and the
balance only shall be allowed or paid."81 This would appear to
allow set-off in every case involving mutual claims between the
bankrupt and one of the creditors.82 Disallowing set-off when the
77. J. MACLACHLAN, supra note 5, at 15. In addition to the exemption allowances,
priorities, such as administrative expenses and tax liabilities, contribute to this result. Id.;
see I1 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1976). See also Countryman, The Bankruptcy Boom, 77 HARv. L.
REv. 1452 (1964):
"No asset" cases, in which there is nothing for administrative expenses after the
allowance of the debtor's exemptions, account for three-quarters of the straight
bankruptcy cases terminated other than by dismissal. "Nominal asset" cases, in
which there is something for administrative expenses but nothing for creditors,
constitute another 12%. Thus, only 13% of the straight bankruptcy cases are "as-
set" cases in which there is something for creditors.
Id. at 1453 (fo6tnote omitted).
78. Even if some assets do remain-after exemptions and priorities are taken out-for
distribution to general creditors, allowing the violating creditor to set off his Truth-in-
Lending liability against his claim in the estate would only reduce his pro rata share of the
estate, a share which is likely to be insignificant in any event.
79. 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1976).
80. Occasionally, an award of sizable attorney's fees to the trustee imposes a signifi-
cant burden upon the violating creditor. See note 68 supra.
81. 11 U.S.C. § 108(a) (1976).
82. Recently, courts have practically disregarded the requirement in § 68 of mutuality
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bankrupt and the creditor have mutual debts would impose a pun-
ishment on the creditor, adding insult to the injury of the bad debt
loss he has already suffered. Indeed, it is to further the penal
objectives of certain kinds of liabilities that courts occasionally
read section 68 narrowly and disallow set-off, in spite of the ap-
parently mandatory statutory requirement to the contrary. 3
Recognition of the punitive, deterrent aspects of liability is the
sine qua non of denying set-off. However, the Murphy court's
conclusion that a Truth-in-Lending claim by nature is not penal
will lead to a critical impasse when the set-off issue arises. Had
that issue been pressed in Murphy, the court would have had to
allow set-off to be consistent with its assertion that the claim is not
penal.
Newton v. Beneficial Finance Co.,84 a case from the Fifth Cir-
cuit decided almost contemporaneously with the Sixth Circuit's
Murphy, illustrates the conflicting conceptions of Truth-in-Lend-
ing liability among the circuits. In Newton, Beneficial Finance
between the respective claims of the estate and the creditor. See, e.g., Diplomat Elec., Inc.
v. Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co., 499 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1974) (allowing set-off of credi-
tor's liability to bankrupt for defamation against bankrupt's contractual liability to credi-
tor). History suggests, however, that the mutuality requirement might not be met in every
case. See, e.g., In re Becker Bros., 139 F. 366 (M.D. Pa. 1905) (only claims arising from the
same transaction can be "mutual debts" or "mutual credits"). See also Texas Tool Traders
v. W.E. Grace Mfg. Co., 488 S.W.2d 498 (rex. Ct. App. 1972) (set-off of creditor's liability
for charging usurious interest denied because such liability is not a "mutual debt" owed to
the estate).
83. E.g., McCollum v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank, 303 U.S. 245 (1938); Newton v. Benefi-
cial Fin. Co., 558 F.2d 731 (5th Cir. 1977); Texas Tool Traders v. W.E. Grace Mfg. Co., 488
S.W.2d 498 (rex. Ct. App. 1972). The right of set-off is based on equitable principles, 4A
W. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 68.02, at 851-52 (14th ed. 1978), and despite the
mandatory language of§ 68 of the Bankruptcy Act, the courts have considered the applica-
tion of set-off in bankruptcy to be a discretionary matter. See Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co.
v. DeWitt, 237 U.S. 447, 455 (1915), where the Court stated: "The provision is permissive
rather than mandatory, and does not enlarge the doctrine of set-off, and cannot be invoked
in cases where the general principles of set-off would not justify it."
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 should not significantly change the current prac-
tice regarding set-off. The new Act provides:
[Tihis title does not affect any right of a creditor to offset a mutual debt owing by
such creditor to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under
this title against a claim of such creditor against the debtor that arose before the
commencement of the case ....
Bankruptcy Reform Act, supra note 12, § 101 (to be codified in I1 U.S.C. § 553(a)). The
new language clarifies the permissive, discretionary nature of set-off; the "general princi-
ples" espoused in Cumberland Glass, 237 U.S. at 455, should continue to govern its applica-
tion. Therefore, it will still be necessary in practice under the new Bankruptcy Act to
emphasize the penal objectives of the Truth in Lending Act-rather than its remedial as-
pects-in order to preclude set-off.
84. 558 F.2d 731 (5th Cir. 1977).
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had loaned Newton $672. When Newton filed his petition in
bankruptcy, $612 was outstanding on the loan. 5 Newton listed
the money owed to Beneficial on his schedule of debts and listed a
Truth-in-Lending claim against Beneficial Finance as an asset of
his estate. The trustee abandoned the claim and it reverted to the
bankrupt, thus precluding litigation over its transferability.8 6 The
debt owed to Beneficial Finance was included in Newton's dis-
charge in bankruptcy.
Later, in a separate action, Newton personally brought suit
against Beneficial Finance in federal district court alleging viola-
tions of the Truth in Lending Act. He recovered under the civil
liability section of the Act.87 Beneficial Finance appealed, argu-
ing that the underlying debt on the loan contract should have been
used to offset the Truth-in-Lending judgment instead of being
fully discharged. The Fifth Circuit disagreed. The court of ap-
peals reasoned that the punitive purpose of the Truth in Lending
Act precludes the use of set-off to decrease the amount of a debt
discharged. 8
Since Newton involved a postbankruptcy suit, the Fifth Circuit
could have avoided the remedy-penalty discussion by resorting to
the rule that a debt discharged in bankruptcy may not be revived
to offset a judgment recovered by the bankrupt in a subsequent
suit against a former creditor.89 Instead, the court focused on the
penal nature of Truth-in-Lending liability and emphasized that
the Act's deterrent objective would not otherwise be effectuated in
bankruptcy. This raises the question how a trustee can acquire the
right to bring a Truth-in-Lending action in a jurisdiction that fol-
lows the Newton court's conception of the action as penal since
only remedial actions may pass to the trustee. The correlative
question also arises: How can set-off be avoided in a jurisdiction
following Murphy or Porter since only penal judgments escape
set-off? Resolution of this dilemma necessitates the development
85. Id. at 731-32.
86. Id. at 732. For a discussion of abandonment of property by the trustee, see 4A W.
COLLIER, supra note 83, 1 70.42[3], at 504-12; J. MACLACHLAN, supra note 5, at 119-20.
87. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1976).
88. 558 F.2d at 732.
89. See Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. DeWitt, 237 U.S. 447 (1915). The Newton
court perceived no significance in the fact that the case involved a postbankruptcy suit.
The reasoning in Newton would therefore operate to preclude set-off respecting Truth-in-
Lending actions brought by the trustee during the pendency of the bankruptcy case. Cf.
Texas Tool Traders v. W.E. Grace Mfg. Co., 488 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972) ("disci-
plinary nature" of penalty for charging usurious interest precludes its characterization as a
"mutual debt" within Bankruptcy Act § 68 (relating to set-off)).
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of an alternative rationale for the passage issue. The solution pro-
posed in this Note is based upon an analogy between usury laws.
and the Truth in Lending Act.
III. THE TRUTH IN LENDING ACT AND USURY
Newton relied principally on a 1938 Supreme Court case, Mc-
Collum v. Hamilton National Bank.9" There the Court disallowed
the setting-off of a judgment won by the trustee in bankruptcy in a
usury action brought against one of the claiming creditors.
McCollum should be controlling on the issue of set-off of Truth-
in-Lending liability.
In McCollum, a trustee in bankruptcy sued a creditor to re-
cover the statutory penalty for the charging of usurious interest.9 '
The creditor prevailed on his assertions that the trustee's usury
claim was subject to set-off and that it should be applied as a
credit upon the underlying debt, thus merely reducing the credi-
tor's claim against the estate.92 The Supreme Court reversed. The
crux of Justice Butler's opinion for a unanimous Court high-
lighted the deterrent purpose and the penal nature of the usury
action:
To allow respondent to satisfy the judgment for penalty by
mere deduction from its claim against the bankrupt's estate is
to detract from the punishment definitely prescribed. The sen-
tence specifically required by the law may not be cut down by
implication, set-off or construction; for that would narrow the
statute and tend to defeat its purpose.
... Liability for the penalty does not arise in contract but is
laid in invitum as a disciplinary measure.
• ..It follows that respondent is not entitled to satisfy peti-
tioner's judgment by deducting the amount of it from respon-
dent's claim against the bankrupt's estate. 93
This statement obviously conflicts with the Murphy court's insis-
tence that the Truth in Lending Act "is not the sort of statutory
90. 303 U.S. 245 (1938).
91. The trustee in McCollum acquired the right to sue pursuant to the usury statute.
The statute provided that in case of violations "the person by whom [the excessive interest]
has been paid, or his legal representatives, may recover back, in an action in the nature of
an action of debt, twice the amount of the interest thus paid .... 303 U.S. at 246 n.2
(emphasis added) (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 86 (1976)). McCollum was litigated
before the Bankruptcy Act was amended in 1938 to provide expressly for the passage of
usury actions to the trustee.
92. 303 U.S. at 246.
93. Id. at 248-49.
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scheme properly characterized as penal."94 Although the Murphy
court was not faced with the problem of set-off, it would have
been inconsistent for it to have adopted the reasoning of
McCollum as authority for denying set-off after allowing a trustee
to bring the action on the ground that it is not penal.95
It is possible to avoid this morass by looking to section 70a(6)
of the Bankruptcy Act instead of section 70a(5). Section 70a(6)
provides that the trustee succeeds to all the bankrupt's "rights of
action arising upon contracts, or usury ..... 96 A court could
determine that a Truth-in-Lending action passes to a trustee in
bankruptcy on the basis of this section alone and ignore the entan-
glements engendered by the transferability requirement of section
70a(5).
Of course, usury and liability under the Truth in Lending Act
are not identical. The Act does not place an express ceiling on
lawful interest rates as do the usury statutes.97 Some analogizing
is necessary, and not all courts have been willing to draw the anal-
ogy. When the court of appeals affirmed the district court's deci-
sion in Murphy, for example, it declined to accept the lower
court's finding that a Truth-in-Lending action passes to the trustee
as a usury action would.98 Instead, it limited its discussion to the
survivability of actions at common law in order to meet the requi-
sites of section 70a(5). Similarly, in Porter, the court suggested
that a Truth-in-Lending cause of action "may well" pass to the
trustee under section 70a(6), but rested its holding solely on the
94. Murphy v. Household Fin. Corp., 560 F.2d 206, 211 (5th Cir. 1977).
95. Of course a court could respond that liability such as that created by the Truth in
Lending Act is penal for some purposes and remedial for others. See Derdiarian v. Futter-
man Corp., 223 F. Supp. 265, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), quoted in Porter v. Household Fin.
Corp., 385 F. Supp. 336, 342 n.7 (S.D. Ohio 1974): "The use of labels such as 'penal' or
'remedial' is, of course, unsatisfactory unless it is recognized as a shorthand way of expres-
sing relevant considerations." Within the context of a single decision, however, the rem-
edy-penalty debate produces either inconsistent reasoning or unsatisfactory results.
96. 11 U.S.C. § I 10(a)(6) (1976). For discussions of the passage of a bankrupt's usury
action to the trustee, see 4A W. COLLIER, supra note 83, 1 70.28[7], at 414; Krause, The
Treatment of Usury in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 29 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 1083 (1954).
A Truth-in-Lending action is not sufficiently similar to a contract action to justify pas-
sage on that ground under § 70a(6). It is true that liability may arise from the most impor-
tant terms of the loan contract-the finance charge and the annual percentage rate of
interest. See 15 U.S.C. §§1605, 1606 (1976); 12 C.F.R. §§226.4, .5 (1977). Nevertheless, the
theoretical underpinnings of the statutory liability clearly rest upon information failure and
nondisclosure and not upon the existence or breach of the contract. See Sellers v. Woll-
man, 510 F.2d 119, 122 (5th Cir. 1975); 1 R. CLONTZ, supra note 24, T 3.10 [9][a], at 3-218.
97. See 45 AM. JUR. 2d Interest and Usury §314 (1969); Tanner, Truth in Lending and
Regulation-A Primer, 6 GA. ST. BJ. 19 (1969).
98. 560 F.2d at 208.
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demands of section 70a(5). 99
One court, however, has wholeheartedly adopted the usury ra-
tionale. Liberty Loan Corp. v. Boyajian (In re Dunne)'0o held that
the right to prosecute a bankrupt's Truth-in-Lending action passes
to the trustee "under the plain language of [section 70a(6)]," that
is, as a "right of action arising upon. . . usury."'' By avoiding
the penalty-remedy discussion, Dunne did not complicate the set-
off issue. The punitive aspects of Truth-in-Lending actions re-
main uncompromised for the purpose of preventing set-off, yet
are properly deemed irrelevant in determining the trustee's right
to sue. Dunne, however, does not explore the usury analogy. It is
worth discussing.
The purposes of the Truth in Lending Act and usury statutes
are identical: the protection of debtors from overreaching by cred-
itors. Both provide sanctions against unacceptable practices asso-
ciated with the extension of credit while leaving the underlying
loan (without regard to credit charges or interest rates) untouched.
Both impose liability based on multiples of the finance charge or
interest rate. 0 2 Both include criminal sanctions, 0 3 yet encourage
private enforcement by allowing recoveries which far exceed ac-
tual damages.
It is arguable that widespread compliance with the Truth in
Lending Act can actually prevent the imposition of excessive in-
terest rates. The Act requires "a meaningful disclosure of credit
terms" so that potential borrowers will be able to compare the
terms offered by several lenders and thereby avoid the unin-
formed purchase of credit." Congress acted on the assumptions
that borrowers will shop for "the best terms available"' 10 5 and that
informed borrowers will be less likely to assume liabilities they
cannot meet than those who are ignorant of the true costs of their
loans."° Consequently, as Congress concluded, "the competition
99. 385 F. Supp. at 344.
100. 407 F. Supp. 308 (D.R.I. 1976).
101. Id. at 310.
102. Compare 12 U.S.C. § 86 (1976), providing for recovery of twice the amount of the
interest charged from national banks charging usurious interest with 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)
(2)(A)(i) (1976), allowing Truth-in-Lending plaintiffs twice the amount of the finance
charge.
103. 15 U.S.C. § 1611 (1976) (criminal liability under Truth in Lending Act for willful
and knowing violation); 45 AM. JUR. 2d Interest and Usury § 357 (1969) (a collection of
cases which hold that usury is punishable by statute as a crime).
104. 15 U.S.C. §1601 (1976).




among the various financial institutions. . engaged in the exten-
sion of consumer credit [will] be strengthened .... -1o7 This is
because, other factors being equal, informed borrowers will pa-
tronize lenders offering the lowest credit rates, forcing other lend-
ers to lower their rates or lose business.' 8 Thus, by discouraging
excessive interest rates, the Truth in Lending Act indirectly ac-
complishes the same objective as the usury laws; yet it does so
without jeopardizing the availability of credit to high-risk borrow-
ers.
Support for the view that Truth-in-Lending actions may pass
to the trustee because they are similar to usury actions is also
found in the history of the Bankruptcy Act. As originally enacted
in 1898, section 70a(6) did not refer to usury actions.10 9 It was
amended to include a specific reference to usury when the Bank-
ruptcy Act was overhauled by the Chandler Act in 1938.110 The
reasons underlying the 1938 amendment to section 70a(6) strongly
suggest that Truth-in-Lending actions should be included within
the scope of that section.
There is a remarkable historical parallel between the early
cases involving usury in bankruptcy and the current developments
concerning Truth-in-Lending actions in the bankruptcy context.
Before the amendment, there was considerable doubt whether ac-
tions for usury could vest in the trustee in bankruptcy."' The
conflict focused on the question whether liability for usury was
107. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (1976).
108. Of course, the risk of lending to a particular borrower influences the cost of credit
in particular transactions. It is questionable whether those consumers who go bankrupt
are, as a class, high-risk borrowers. The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States found that:
While a significant number of consumer debtors may have squandered limited
earnings on extravagances, most studies of nonbusiness bankrupts show that
debts incurred were for necessities or near-necessities for family living. A fair
picture of consumer bankrupts appears to be one of living close to the edge, Ze.,
of personal economies in which all earnings must be devoted to immediate needs
and the payment of installment debts, without savings or uncommitted income
reserved for the contingencies of health expenses not covered by insurance, of
reductions in income through loss of overtime or a second job, or of the added
expenses of household disruption through divorce, separation, or other family
strife.
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
Doc. No. 93-137, Pt. 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1973). In any event, market pressures
should reduce credit costs for informed borrowers presenting similar lending risks.
109. See Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, § 70(a)(6), 30 Stat. 566 (1898) (current version at 11
U.S.C. § 110(a)(6) (1976)).
110. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840.
111. See 4A W. COLLIER, supra note 83, 70.03, at 36 n.14.
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penal or remedial, 12 thus foreshadowing the current discussion of
Truth-in-Lending liability. Some courts regarded the statutory
right of action based upon a usurious transaction as a purely per-
sonal right, that is, as a penalty enforceable only by the debtor." 3
Others took the view that the right of action could pass to the
trustee; these cases, however, involved usury statutes that ex-
pressly authorized recovery by the borrower's legal representa-
tives." 4 The widely-accepted common law rule was clear: absent
a statutory provision to the contrary, the right to recover penalties
such as those imposed by usury laws was not assignable or trans-
ferable.1 15
This conflict spurred congressional action in 1938. Section
70a(6) of the Bankruptcy Act, dealing with the scope of the
trustee's title, was amended to include "rights of action arising
upon. . .usury."' 1 6 Section 70c was amended to ensure that the
trustee would have the benefit of "all defenses available to the
bankrupt as against third persons, including. . . usury, and other
personal defenses.""' 7 The 1938 amendments thus evince a con-
gressional intent to enlarge the group of bankrupts' rights that
pass to the trustee. By analogy, it is reasonable to conclude that
other rights of action arising from credit transactions should pass
from the bankrupt to the trustee for the benefit of the estate.
When the 1938 amendments relating to usury were enacted,
the sanctions against usury were the only means, short of equita-
ble relief, of preventing the inequities that can result from the une-
qual distribution of bargaining power often present in consumer
credit transactions. But the traditional conception of the term
"usury" has become inadequate to describe the array of legislation
enacted since 1938 to regulate consumer credit transactions. The
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure themselves recognize the inade-
quacy of the term and update its meaning. Consider how the
Rules clarify section 656(b) of the Bankruptcy Act. Section 656(b)
112. See Annot., 82 A.L.R. 1008 (1933).
113. E.g., Lafountain v. Burlington Sav. Bank, 56 Vt. 332 (1883); Nichols & Bliss v.
Bellows, 22 Vt. 581 (1849).
114. E.g., Lasater v. First Nat'l Bank, 96 Tex. 345,72 S.W. 1057 (1903), aff'd, 196 U.S.
115 (1905) (usury statute). McCollum v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank, 303 U.S. 245 (1938), dis-
cussed at text accompanying notes 90-93 supra, involved such a provision, currently at 12
U.S.C. § 86 (1976) (authorizing recovery by borrowers' legal representatives of usurious
interest from national banks).
115. See 36 AM. JUR. 2d Forfeitures and Penalties § 56 (1968).
116. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 70a(6), 52 Stat. 880 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 110
(a)(6) (1976)).
117. Id. §70c, 52 Stat. 881 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § l10(c) (1976)).
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provides with respect to chapter XIII wage earners' plans:""
'Before confirming any such plan the court shall require proof
from each creditor filing a claim that such claim isfreefrom usury
as defined by the laws of the place where the debt was con-
tracted.""' 9 When the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure were
adopted in 1973, rule 13-301 of the chapter XIII Rules, prescrib-
ing the content of the proof of claim required by section 656(b),
modified the original terminology: "A proof of claim shall consist
of a statement in writing setting forth a creditor's claim and setting
forth facts showing that such claim isfreefrom any charge forbid-
den by applicable law." 20 The Advisory Committee's Note to rule
13-301 explains: "The term 'charge forbidden' is substituted for
'usury' in order to take account of the varying terminology of
small loan laws, retail installment sales laws, the Uniform Con-
sumer Credit Code and the Federal Consumer Credit Protection
Act."'' Thus, to the framers of the Rules, the term "usury" em-
braced more than simply the charging of excessive interest rates.
The courts have recognized that this expansive conception of
usury includes Truth-in-Lending actions. Although the court in
Porter did not rely heavily upon the similarity between the usury
statutes and the Truth in Lending Act in concluding that the ac-
tion passes to the trustee, the court commented that the Truth in
Lending Act may be "but a sub-type of usury law."' 22 Yet so far
only the Dunne court has concluded that the Truth in Lending Act
and usury laws are of the "same genre,"'' 23 stating unequivocally
that "[r]ights of action involving the [Truth in Lending Act]
should pass to a trustee in the same way as do those involving
usury." 24 The Dunne court acknowledged that it might agree
with the bankruptcy judge's decision that the right to sue passes to
the trustee under section 70a(5), but concluded that a "clearer case
is made . . . under subdivision (6) of [that] section."'' 25
118. "Wage earners' plans" under chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act feature, instead
of an outright discharge, a composition of debts, with creditors taking an amount smaller
than the original liability, an extension of time for payment, or both. See Bankruptcy Act
§ 606(7), 11 U.S.C. § 1006(7) (1976).
119. 11 U.S.C. § 1056(b) (1976) (emphasis added).
120. R. BANKR. PROC. 13-301 (emphasis added).
121. The Truth in Lending Act is title I of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1692o 1976)).
122. Porter v. Household Fin. Corp., 385 F. Supp. 336, 345 (S.D. Ohio 1974).
123. Liberty Loan Corp. v. Boyajian (In re Dunne), 407 F. Supp. 308, 310 (D.R.I.
1976).
124. Id.
125. Id See text accompanying note 116 supra.
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Because of its straightforward approach, the Dunne decision
stands as the most sound authority on the passage of Truth-in-
Lending actions to trustees in bankruptcy. The court engaged in
no attenuated discussion of whether a Truth-in-Lending claim is
more accurately characterized as a remedy or a penalty. In a ju-
risdiction following the Dunne court's approach, the Truth in
Lending Act's deterrent purposes may be more fully effected
when it becomes necessary to confront the issue of set-off.
IV. CONCLUSION
The analogy between usury actions and Truth-in-Lending ac-
tions is not perfect. Yet it is sufficiently close to provide convinc-
ing justification for allowing trustees in bankruptcy the right to
pursue bankrupts' Truth-in-Lending claims. Unfortunately, most
courts still resort to antiquated and fictitious survival-of-actions
principles to justify passing the right to sue to the trustee. The
result in these cases is satisfactory since the trustee is in an oppor-
tune position to enforce consumer credit protection legislation.
Yet such reasoning necessitates labeling the liability as exclusively
remedial, thus dismissing its deterrent, punitive purposes and
complicating the resolution of the problem of set-off in bank-
ruptcy. Acknowledgment of the penal aspects of a Truth-in-Lend-
ing action is the sine qua non of disallowing set-off of a Truth-in-
Lending judgment against a violating creditor's claim in the bank-
rupt's estate.
Bankruptcy and consumer-creditor protection legislation are
bound to intersect, perhaps with greater frequency as such legisla-
tion broadens in scope.'2 6 Although no one wins in bankruptcy,
its occurrence should not permit a Truth-in-Lending violator to
escape civil liability by setting it off against a practically valueless
claim in the estate. If the courts treat the Truth in Lending Act
simply as a modem species of usury law, effective enforcement of
its disclosure requirements may be more fully achieved.
BRIAN S. HARvEY
126. The most recent addition to the increasingly comprehensive Consumer Credit Pro-
tection Act is the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874
(codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1692-1692o (Supp. 1978)).
[Vol. 29:270
